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"BUT MOST OF IT BELONGS TO THOSE YET TO BE 
BORN:" THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, NEPA, AND 
THE STEWARDSHIP ETHIC 
Timothy Patrick Brady· 
One Frenchman told of a prudent African solution. He had suggested 
the digging of a well in his village in a time of drought. Many of the 
villagers agreed. But then, others argued, it would bring people from 
other villages and they would bring their cattle and that would increase 
the pressure on the already precious grass ... "Well then [the French-
man said to the villagers], why not explain that the well is only for 
your own village. Tell them to dig their own" ... "But water is not 
ours, but from God and must be shared." All in all, they concluded, it 
was wiser not to dig the well at all. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The decision of the villagers to refrain from digging a well un-
doubtedly would seem to many to be not only a wrong decision, but 
the worst decision. 2 When faced with a drought, the most sensible 
solution would seem to be to find and exploit any possible water 
source. Yet the villagers decided to the contrary. 
* Articles Editor, 1989-90, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Layton, Conserving the planet or rushing to disaster?, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 701, 701 
(1986). 
2 A similar decision under similar circumstances has been made here in the United States. 
Arizona has banned the extension of irrigation systems under certain circumstances. ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-411 to -637 (1987 & Supp. 1988) (declaration of and management in 
groundwater areas). In addition, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that this statute did 
not constitute an unconstitutional taking. Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 131 Ariz. 
78, 80-88, 638 P.2d 1324, 1326-27 (1981), appeal dismissed, 457 U.S. 1101 (1982). 
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The villagers' decision not to dig the well is interesting for two 
reasons. First, the villagers in some way realized that the needs of 
the present generation were not determinative of a solution. All too 
often the needs of a present generation are determinative of solutions 
to present problems, with little thought given to the consequences 
of those solutions. The various environmental crises that beset our 
nation and our world, for example, may be traced in part to the 
problem-solving of a series of present generations who did not con-
sider the environmental impacts of their actions. 3 
The second reason why the villagers' decision is interesting is 
related to the first. The villagers believed that a present generation's 
problem-solving actions had to be limited by the very nature of the 
necessary resources. Thus, the villagers could not exert exclusive 
dominion over a well, because the very nature of the water prohib-
ited them from doing so. Water was from God, they reasoned, and 
its divine origin rendered the water insusceptible of private owner-
ship. 
The two reasons which make the villagers' decision not to build 
the well interesting also apply to the public trust doctrine. This 
doctrine looks beyond the needs of the present generation, and also 
suggests that certain resources are invested with a special nature. 
But the public trust doctrine4 is intriguing for more reasons than 
just these two. 
Since the publication of Joseph Sax's landmark article on the public 
trust doctrine in 1970,5 the doctrine has become a widely discussed 
3 The crises of acid rain, ozone depletion, the greenhouse effect, and the threatened extinc-
tion of so many animal species have all been brought about by a series of present generations 
who have acted without thought of, or in flagrant disregard for, the needs of future genera-
tions. See generally THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR 
COMMON FUTURE (1987); Grosvenor, Will We Mend Our Earth?, 174 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 766 
(1988); NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY, EARTH '88: CHANGING GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES 
(1988). 
4 The public trust doctrine itself is difficult to define with precision. Joseph Sax stated that 
it is merely the channel through which a court may express its own reservations about the 
"insufficiencies" of the democratic process. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Re-
source Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 521 (1970). Richard 
Lazarus calls the public trust doctrine an "amorphous notion" which holds that the public is 
vested with certain rights in certain natural resources. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of 
Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 1986 
IOWA L. REV. 631, 632; see also Jawetz, The Public Trust Totem in Public Land Law: 
Ineffective-And Undesirable-Judicial Intervention, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 455, 457 (1982). This 
Comment adopts Lazarus's restatement of Justinian rather than Sax's definition of the public 
trust doctrine. 
5 Sax, supra note 4. 
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topic. 6 Yet it is still unclear what the doctrine is,7 where the doctrine 
came from, 8 or what the doctrine's future will be. 9 
This Comment proposes that the future of the public trust doctrine 
lies in its ability to change the way society considers the needs and 
rights of future generations. This challenge can be seen as lying 
dormant in the roots of the doctrine itself. Therefore, it is necessary 
to examine the history of the public trust doctrine. Next, in analyzing 
the current calls for the demise of the public trust doctrine in Section 
III, this Comment argues that the doctrine does have a legitimate 
purpose in society, and that this purpose is to act as a catalyst for 
social change. Section IV of this Comment examines the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 as the possible situs for the ap-
plication of the public trust doctrine in modern American law. The 
conclusion of this Comment calls for a renewed appreciation of the 
public trust doctrine as a legal device that challenges legal percep-
tions and assumptions about land ownership. 
6 The topic is so widely discussed that only a sampling of recent work is given here: Allison, 
The Public Trust Doctrine in Washington, 10 u. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 633 (1987); Huffman, 
Avoiding the Takings Clause Through the Myth of Public Rights: The Public Trust and 
Reserved Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 171 (1987); Oehme, Judicial 
Expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine: Creating a Right of Public Access to Florida's 
Beaches, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 75 (1987); Lazarus, supra note 4; Comment, The Public 
Trust Doctrine-A Tool to Make Federal Administrative Agencies Increase Protection of 
Public Land and Its Resources, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 385 (1988) [hereinafter 
Comment, Federal Administrative Agencies]; Note, The Public Trust Doctrine: Accomodating 
the Public Within Constitutional Bounds, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1087 (1988); Comment, The 
Mono Lake Problem and the Public Trust Doctrine, 7 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 67 (1987); 
Comment, Private Rights and the Public Trust: Opposing Lakeshore Funnel Development, 
15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 105 (1987); Comment, Sand Rights: Using California's Public 
Trust Doctrine to Protect Against Coastal Erosion, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 727 (1987); Note, 
Access to New Jersey Beaches: The Public Trust Doctrine, 20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 
437 (1986); Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine-A Tool For Expanding Recreational Raft-
ing Rights in Colorado, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 625 (1986). For a listing of some earlier work, 
see Lazarus, supra note 4, at 643-44 nn.75-76. 
7 Note, The Public Trust Doctrine: A New Approach to Environmental Preservation, 81 
W. VA. L. REV. 455, 455 (1979) ("The doctrine has remained for the most part a vague legal 
concept filled with misconceptions and subject to a traditionally narrow application. "). 
8 Comment, Federal Administrative Agencies, supra note 6, at 388 (from Justinian). Al-
though the theory of the public trust doctrine is most often traced back to Justinian, at least 
one commentator insists that the doctrine rests entirely on legal fictions. Lazarus, supra note 
4, at 656. 
9 Compare Comment, Federal Administrative Agencies, supra note 6, at 435-36 (public 
trust doctrine can serve to "enhance the protection of valuable and irreplaceable natural 
resources") with Lazarus, supra note 4, at 715-16 (public trust doctrine inhibits the devel-
opment of natural resources law and should be abandoned). 
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II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
A. Pre-Roman Sources of the Public Trust Doctrine 
The source of the modern public trust doctrine has been traced 
most often to Roman civil law and, more specifically, to the Institutes 
of Justinian (lnstitutes).l0 The Institutes' categorization of certain 
types of property as "common to all,"ll however, is not original, but 
rather employs a concept much older than Justinian. 12 Indeed, the 
doctrine may be thousands of years old. 
The myth of a "lost Eden" has been popular in Western civilization 
for most of the Christian era. The Garden of Eden symbolized a 
state of perfection that was lost through original sin. But an impor-
tant lesson to be drawn from the story of Eden was that God created 
the earth for the common possession of Adam and Eve and their 
children. Thus, while private property rights are certainly recog-
nized in the Bible,13 the perfect state is not the private possession 
of property, but common ownership. 14 
Roman culture had its myth of a communal beginning as well. Ovid 
wrote of a Golden Age in which people lived in peace without the 
need of law, the earth produced all necessary food without the need 
offarming, and the land was "common to all."15 In both the Christian 
myth of Eden and Ovid's myth of a Golden Age, then, there is a 
striking preference for the common possession of land. 16 
While these myths are not the legal source of the public trust 
doctrine, it is important to note the power inherent in the belief of 
a lost time of perfection in which land was a communal possession. 
It is a tribute to the power of these myths, of the perceived rightness 
of common possession of. the land, that this perception has insinuated 
itself into law in the guise of the public trust doctrine. 
10 See, e.g., Note, supra note 7, at 455; Comment, Federal Administrative Agencies, supra 
note 6, at 388; Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts Land Law, 11 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 839, 843 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Massachusetts Land Law]. 
11 Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA 
GRANT L.J. 13, 23 (1976). 
12 See infra notes 15-23 and accompanying text. 
13 Consider the 7th Commandment: "Thou shalt not steal." Exodus 20:15, Deut. 5:19 (King 
James). A prohibition against stealing necessarily implies some sense of private property. 
14 See Acts 2:42-47. 
15 Deveney, supra note 11, at 26-27 (quoting OVID, THE METAMORPHOSES). 
16 Some cultures never appeared to have had the need for a "fall" from common possession 
of the land, because these cultures never developed a concept of private possession of land. 
The most notable example of such a culture is the early American Indian, to whom the white 
man's talk of buying and selling land was simply incomprehensible. 
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B. Roman Origins of the Public Trust Doctrine 
All references to "things common to all" in Roman law, including 
the references in the Institutes, are traceable to the works of the 
Roman jurist Marcian. 17 Marcian in turn had been influenced by the 
poets and philosophers of ancient Rome, who believed in the myth 
of a Golden Age. 18 Thus, the origins of the category of "things 
common to all" was undoubtedly heavily influenced by philosophical 
concepts. 19 
The inclusion of the category of "things common to all" in the 
Institutes20 did not mean that private ownership of things within 
this category was forbidden. On the contrary, it was quite common 
to grant monopolies to individuals or corporations to exploit the 
natural resources in areas supposedly common to all. 21 Nor should 
the inclusion of the category "things common to all" imply that 
Roman law recognized the concept of a trust, because Roman law 
had no analogue to today's concept of trusts. 22 The inclusion of this 
category appears to have been more a normative statement of what 
ought to be rather than a legal recognition of what already was.23 
C. English Roots of the Public Trust Doctrine 
The public trust doctrine was introduced into English law through 
the writings of Bracton, who incorporated parts of the Institutes, 
including the passage on "things common to all," into English law. 24 
Once again, it appears that the "law" that Bracton stated may not 
have accurately reflected the customs of society, but was rather a 
statement of what the law ought to be. 25 
17 Deveney, supra note 11, at 26. 
18 [d. 
19 [d. at 26-27, 34. Marcian included air, flowing water, the sea, and the seashore in the 
category of "things common to all." [d. at 27. 
20 The INSTITUTES apparently appropriated Marcian's list: "And indeed, all of these things 
are by natural law common to all: air, flowing water, the sea and, consequently, the shores of 
the sea." Deveney, supra note 11, at 23 (quoting the INSTITUTES). 
21 Deveney, supra note 11, at 33 (citing the grant of exclusive rights in the Tiber River to 
a group of sponge gatherers and fishermen). This sort of grant was apparently common. [d. 
22 W. BUCKLAND, EQUITY IN ROMAN LAW 15 (2d printing 1983). 
23 Lazarus, supra note 4, at 634. One commentator suggests that the category of "things 
common to all" was based more on a need to protect the economic well-being of an empire 
that depended heavily upon the sea for virtually all its needs. Comment, Massachusetts Land 
Law, supra note 10, at 841-43. Although economic concerns often shape the framing of laws, 
it is at least equally likely that earlier myths of the Golden Age influenced the category of 
"things common to all." Deveney, supra note 11, at 34. 
24 Deveney, supra note 11, at 36. 
25 [d.; Lazarus, supra note 4, at 635. 
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In England, the public trust doctrine developed into the jus pub-
licum, which held that the Crown possessed the sea, the rivers, and 
the land underlying the waters seaward of the high water mark for 
the benefit of the public. 26 At first, however, this possession did not 
mean that the Crown could not pass title to areas such as the 
foreshore. 27 Matthew Hale, the highly influential Lord Chief Justice 
of England at the time of Charles II, recognized that the foreshore 
could be, and in fact was, validly held by private individuals. 28 
The power of the Crown to convey title to the foreshore, however, 
was not absolute. According to Hale, even though title might pass 
to an individual, the public still retained an interest in navigation. 29 
More importantly, Hale recognized that this retained right of navi-
gation was effectively a legal brake upon the power of the Crown, 30 
and was a form of trust duty to preserve free navigation imposed 
upon the Crown for the benefit of the public.31 
D. The American Roots of the Public Trust Doctrine 
I t is customary to trace the beginnings of the public trust doctrine 
in American law back to the landmark case of Illinois Central Rail-
road Co. v. Illinois. 32 Two other important cases preceded Illinois 
Central, however, and these must be considered first. 
Arnold v. Mundy,33 a New Jersey Supreme Court decision, ap-
pears to have been the first American case to consider the public 
trust doctrine's applicability in the United States. 34 The plaintiff 
26 Comment, Federal Administrative Agencies, supra note 6, at 388-89. One commentator 
argues that the Crown adopted this doctrine because the Crown could thereby reap some 
economic gain. Lazarus, supra note 4, at 635. 
27 For purposes of this Comment, the foreshore is defined as the land lying between the 
high and low tide lines. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 890 (1981). 
28 Deveney, supra note 11, at 45. 
29 Id. at 46. 
30Id. Thus, any grant of a portion of the foreshore to an individual by the Crown was 
limited by a negative covenant not to interfere with the public's right of navigation. Any such 
interference could be enjoined as a nuisance. Id. 
3! Id. at 48. The power of the Crown over public waters would, in time, shift more and 
more towards Parliament, until Parliament eventually gained complete control over public 
waters in England. See Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N. Y. 129, 155 (1883). Even Parliament's control 
over this "trust," however, may not be absolute. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 332-33 (1965). 
32 146 U.S. 387 (1892). This custom is undoubtedly due to Sax's reference to this case as 
the "lodestar in American trust law" in his landmark 1970 article. See Sax, supra note 4, at 
489. 
33 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821). 
34 Deveney, supra note 11, at 55. 
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Arnold sued to prevent the defendant Mundy from trespassing into 
an oyster bed in Raritan Bay. Arnold claimed title to the bed, 
traceable to Charles II of England. 35 Mundy argued that, because 
the Crown held the land beneath Raritan Bay as trustee for the 
public,36 any grant made of this land had to have been made subject 
to the right of the people to navigate and fish.37 Chief Justice Kirk-
patrick found for Mundy, and held that the original grant of the land 
was void. 38 
Chief Justice Kirkpatrick's reasoning in Arnold was, in effect, a 
recapitulation of the discussion of the origins of the public trust 
doctrine in the previous sections. 39 The Chief Justice held that, when 
Charles II took possession of Raritan Bay,40 the law of nature,41 
Roman civil law,42 and the common law of England43 all required 
that this land be held in trust for the people. 44 The Crown's title in 
Raritan Bay was transferred to the State of New Jersey as sover-
eign,45 and therefore the State was limited, as the Crown had been 
limited, in its ability to grant away the waters of the State. 46 
In Martin v. Waddell,47 the United States Supreme Court resolved 
a similar dispute. In Martin, however, the plaintiff claimed title to 
the oyster fishery in Raritan Bay on the basis of a grant from the 
New Jersey legislature. 48 Chief Justice Taney had the opportunity 
to rule directly on the merits of the legal theory of the public trust 
35 Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 2-3. 
36 Id. at 3. 
37Id. 
38 Id. at 78 (opinion after reargument). 
39 See supra notes 10-31 and accompanying text. 
40 Charles II took possession in his sovereign capacity by right of discovery. Arnold, 6 
N.J.L. at 77. 
41 The law of nature here is probably best understood as the law of what was intended to 
be, either by the Christian/Deistic god or by nature itself. This appeal to the "law of nature" 
is not unlike the appeal to the Edenic/Golden Age myth discussed in the text accompanying 
supra notes 10-16. 
42 See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. 
43 See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text. 
44 Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 76-77. 
45Id. at 78. 
46Id. The Arnold court did not prevent New Jersey from passing legislation inconsistent 
with its holding. See Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441,459 (1850). The inconsistency was effectively 
nullified later. See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 308-
10, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (1972). Neptune City extended the public rights in tidal lands from the 
traditional rights of navigation and fishing to include bathing, swimming, and other recrea-
tional shore activites. Id. at 309, 294 A.2d at 54. 
4741 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). 
48 I d. at 408. 
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doctrine as expressed in Arnold, but declined to do so, and upheld 
the grant on other grounds. 49 
Justice Thompson's dissent in Martin pointed out that the Su-
preme Court allowed the New Jersey legislature to grant away land 
in a manner that was forbidden by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 50 
Justice Thompson found it even stranger that Taney's opinion, which 
Thompson read as generally supportive of Arnold's precedent, would 
allow the legislative grant to stand in a manner inconsistent with 
the law of Arnold. 51 
The apparent contradiction52 between Arnold and Martin was 
effectively resolved in Illinois Central. 53 In 1869, the Illinois legis-
lature granted away virtually the entire waterfront area of the city 
of Chicago to the Illinois Central Railroad. 54 In 1873, apparently 
having thought better about the deal, the Illinois legislature re-
scinded the grant, 55 and a lawsuit challenging the rescission ensued. 
The Supreme Court held that Illinois did hold title to the land 
underlying the navigable waters of Lake Michigan that was within 
the state's boundaries. 56 Illinois held this title in trust for its citizens 
so that they might navigate and fish freely in the waters of Lake 
Michigan. 57 Thus, Illinois could not convey the land underlying the 
waters of Lake Michigan in such a manner that the public's rights 
of navigation and fishing were destroyed. 58 Illinois could, however, 
convey parcels of trust land to private individuals if the overall effect 
of the conveyance was to improve the ability of the public to exercise 
its trust rights. 59 Because the grant to the Illinois Central Railroad 
did not improve the public's ability to exercise its trust rights but 
rather extinguished those rights, the Court held that the initial grant 
was void.60 
The holding in Illinois Central relied upon the earlier cases of 
Arnold and Martin,61 and through these three cases the public trust 
491d. at 417-18. 
50 Id. at 419-20 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
511d. 
52 Deveney, supra note 11, at 59. 
53 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
54 Sax, supra note 4, at 489. 
55 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 410-11. 
56 I d. at 452. 
571d. 
56 Id. at 452-53. 
591d. 
60 I d. at 454--55. 
61 I d. at 456. 
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doctrine emerged in American law. Just as in Roman law and English 
law, there was no real legal precedent for the adoption of the doctrine 
into American law.62 Illinois Central accepted the reasoning of Mar-
tin and Arnold, Martin relied upon Arnold, and Arnold cited only 
English common law for the public trust doctrine. As discussed 
earlier,63 from a strictly legal standpoint English common law is a 
dubious source for the public trust doctrine. 64 
Given the shaky legal justification upon which the public trust 
doctrine rests, one might wonder why the doctrine should not be 
done away with as a sort of bastard legal doctrine. To answer this 
question, as well as lay the groundwork for a review of current 
criticisms of the public trust doctrine,65 it is necessary to discuss 
briefly two functions of law in society. 
III. A POSSIBLE FUTURE FOR THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
A. Law as a Reflection oj, or Challenge to, Society's Values 
Ideally, law in a democratic society would be a true reflection of 
society's values. 66 Because law's general function is to regulate be-
havior in society, the perfect match of law and society is one in which 
behavior that is acceptable to society is permitted by law, and be-
havior that is unacceptable to society is rejected by law. 67 As every-
day life makes clear, this perfect match is not achieved easily. But 
even in a less-than-perfect society, law often expresses society's 
sense of what is and is not acceptable, and what is or is not right or 
62 See MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical 
Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. 
U.L. REV. 511, 588-91 (1975). 
63 See supra notes 24--31 and accompanying text. 
64 One commentator bemoans the fact that Chief Justice Kirkpatrick was ill-prepared to 
render an opinion in the Arnold case. MacGrady, supra note 62, at 591. MacGrady seems to 
imply that a better prepared judge would have rendered a different decision, thus sparing 
American law from the public trust doctrine. Id. 
65 See infra notes 77-97 and accompanying text. 
66 In a democratic society, it is the people who are the ultimate source of law. Thus, if a 
society is truly democratic, the will of the people, including their values, is given the force of 
law. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (government must be responsible to 
the will of the people); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 457 (1793) (the people are 
sovereign). 
67 Of course, what is accepted or rejected by society is not necessarily static, and could 
change over time. In a truly democratic society, however, such change would not occur until 
and unless a consensus had been reached by society. See M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT 
SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 153 (1983). 
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wrong. 68 Thus, the criminal law reflects society's condemnation of 
theft, rape, and murder. When law reflects society's values in this 
manner, law is performing its traditional function. 69 
When law performs its traditional function, the law70 essentially 
follows society.71 As society's attitudes and values change, these 
changes are eventually mirrored in the laws governing society.72 The 
development of the law as a result of changes in widely held values 
in society is unlikely to be controversial, because society would want 
the changes to occur. 
Law, however, is not limited to its traditional function of mirroring 
accepted values. Law sometimes may actually leap ahead of society, 
anticipating and setting new values and new standards of conduct. 73 
For example, because of the civil rights movement, the law effec-
tively set a new value and standard of conduct for American society: 
the equality of the races. 74 By setting a new value and standard of 
conduct, the law was substituting its own artificially created "sense 
of the community" for the pre-existing "sense of the community. "75 
When the law anticipates society and sets a new standard of 
conduct, there is almost certainly some type of struggle in response. 
Because society, or some part thereof, sees the new standard as 
68 Caldwell, Land and the Law: Problems in Legal Philosophy, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 
332. 
69 Caldwell, supra note 68, at 332. 
70 "Law" here can be either legislative or common. Legislation, once enacted by the rep-
resentatives of the citizens in a society, presumably reflects citizens' values. The common law, 
while not representational of the citizenry in the same sense as legislation, is also susceptible 
to changes in public opinion. See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1, 1 (1881). But see infra 
note 74 and accompanying text. 
71 Caldwell, supra note 68, at 320. 
72 See id. 
73 [d. at 332. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall would also agree: "To be sure, law 
is often a response to social change, but ... it also can change social patterns. Provided it is 
adequately enforced, law can change things for the better; moreover, it can change the hearts 
of men, for law has an educational function also." Marshall, Law and the Quest for Equality, 
1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 1,8. 
74 Although it is easiest to think of the common law acting in such an anticipatory fashion, 
as seen in the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), legislation 
can also act in the same fashion, as in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
75 It may be argued that the law is not so much a source of reform as it is a conduit for 
reformers. Thus, law does not pull society forward, but reformers do. Nevertheless, for a 
reform to become truly effective, law must reflect the goals of the reform. If reformers are 
able to convince the lawmakers, be they legislators or judges, that their position is "right," 
then the law will serve as a vehicle for social change. See, e.g., H. HOROWITZ & K. KARST, 
LAW, LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE ABOLITION OF SLAV-
ERY, RACIAL SEGREGATION AND INEQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 1 (1969) ("Law 
and lawyers have not created the black revolution. But they have played a critical part in 
institutionalizing the gains of the movement-and thereby making the movement acceptable 
to the Nation's white majority."). 
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alien to its own, society, or some part thereof, attempts to reject 
the new standard and keep its own, previous standard. Once again, 
the civil rights movement is an example. The widespread resistance 
in the South to Brown v. Board of Education is illustrative. 76 
The public trust doctrine can be viewed as law acting in an antic-
ipatory fashion. As discussed in Section II, the public trust doctrine 
has never really been a true reflection of society's values about the 
special character of certain types of land or water. Because the public 
trust doctrine is a result of the law acting in an anticipatory fashion, 
one would expect some sort of controversy. 
B. Criticism of the Modern Public Trust Doctrine 
Since the arrival of the public trust doctrine in American law, 77 
courts have not limited its applicability to the traditional areas of 
navigable waters and the foreshore. Rather, the public trust doctrine 
has been expanded to cover city streets,78 municipal water supplies ,79 
a prehistoric fossil bed,80 an inland state park,81 an inland national 
park,82 and inland wetlands. 83 This expansion has not been welcomed 
76 Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown Ill, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Board of Educ. 
(Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The order to desegregate the schools in the South was fought 
at length. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969) 
(noting that Alabama took no steps to integrate public schools for about lO years); Cooper v. 
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (governor and legislature of Arkansas claimed that they were not 
bound to follow Brown). The Court came to express repeatedly its frustration with foot-
dragging by state and local officials. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 
437-38 (1968); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 689 (1962). For a discussion of resistance 
in the South to Brown, see generally H. HOROWITZ & K. KARST, supra note 75, at 239-350; 
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: THE SHAD-
OWS OF THE PAST (1974). 
77 See supra notes 32-65 and accompanying text. 
78 See, e.g., Lahr v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry., lO4 N.Y. 268, 291, lO4 N.E. 528,532-33 
(1887); Story v. New York Elevated R.R., 90 N.Y. 122, 156-57 (1882); Drake v. Hudson River 
R.R., 7 Barb. 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 1849). See generally Selvin, The Public Trust Doctrine in 
American Law and Economic Policy, 1789-1920, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 1403, 1412-18. 
79 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 640, 57 P. 585, 600-01 (1899); 
Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. City of Fall River, 147 Mass. 548, 557-58, 18 N.E. 465, 472 (1888). 
See generally Selvin, supra note 78. 
80 Defenders of Florrissant, Inc. v. Park Land Co., No. C-1539 (D. Colo. July 9, 1969); No. 
340-69 (10th Cir. July lO, 1969); No. 403-69 (10th Cir. July 29, 1969) (injunction granted to 
prevent developer from building a road through privately owned 34 million-year-old fossil 
bed), discussed in V. YANNACONE, B. COHEN, & S. DAVISON, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND 
REMEDIES § 2:9, at 39-46 (1972). 
81 Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 4lO, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966). See 
generally Comment, Massachusetts Land Law, supra note lO, at 872-74. 
82 Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1975); see 
also Jawetz, supra note 4, at 482-84. 
83 Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 14-17,201 N.W.2d 761, 767-6R (1972). 
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by all, and has prompted some commentators to question the public 
trust doctrine itself. 
One commentator argues that the public trust doctrine has effec-
tively become a deus ex machina used by the courts to allow them 
to escape from difficult decisions. 84 He points out that the public 
trust doctrine's ultimate source is mere myth,85 and its use today by 
the doctrine's proponents is disingenuous. 86 As a result, he argues, 
the modern public trust doctrine consists largely of dicta and philo-
sophizing by judges.87 
Another commentator sees the public trust doctrine as nothing 
more than the illegitimate substitution of judicial opinion for the 
proper exercise of administrative discretion,88 insofar as the doctrine 
is applied to federal inland areas. Arguably, then, judges should not 
interfere with an agency's decision regarding an inland area pur-
portedly subject to the public trust doctrine. 89 
A third commentator suggests that the modern public trust doc-
trine has simply outlived its purpose. 90 Changes in the law governing 
standing,91 nuisance,92 the police power of a state,93 and administra-
tive law94 effectively address the concerns that the public trust doc-
trine was meant to address. Any appeal to the public trust doctrine 
in light of these changes is simply a backward step at a time when 
pressing and complex environmental issues must be faced directly, 
and not through the myth-encrusted public trust doctrine. 95 
84 Deveney, supra note 11, at 81. 
85 [d. at 79; see also supra notes 10-23 and accompanying text. 
86 Deveney, supra note 11, at 80. 
B7 [d. at 81. 
88 Jawetz, supra note 4, at 457. Even Joseph Sax, the "father" of the modern public trust 
doctrine, has come quite close to agreeing with this sentiment. See supra note 4. 
89 Jawetz, supra note 4, at 469-73. Of course, as Jawetz notes, the judge does have power 
to overturn an agency's decision under section 706(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U. S. C. § 706(2) (1982), if the decision is found to be: 
(A) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by substantial 
evidence [in certain cases]; or (F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the 
facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. 
[d. at 472. If no such violation is found, the judge may not overturn the decision absent 
"substantial procedural or substantive reasons." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). 
90 Lazarus, supra note 4, at 657-58. 
91 [d. at 658-60. 
92 [d. at 660-64. 
93 [d. at 665-79. 
94 [d. at 679-88. 
95 [d. at 715-16. 
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These criticisms of the public trust doctrine either point out the 
weaknesses in the legal lineage of the public trust doctrine or argue 
that no present need for the public trust doctrine exists. As a result, 
some commentators conclude that the public trust doctrine is either 
fatally flawed and should be done away with simply as a matter of 
legal honesty, or is simply a relic of the common law that should now 
be retired to the museum of interesting but antiquated law. 96 
The public trust doctrine still has meaningful work to perform. 
While the criticisms discussed above have some validity, these crit-
icisms focus on the place of the public trust doctrine in the past and 
in the present. 97 It may be that the public trust doctrine actually 
belongs to the future. 
C. A Future Role for the Public Trust Doctrine 
Because law sometimes may act as a catalyst for societal change ,98 
a possible role for the public trust doctrine in the future may be to 
serve as a catalyst for change in society's attitudes towards property. 
The public trust doctrine can serve as an effective tool to bring the 
stewardship ethic into law. 
The right to own land is deeply engrained in American culture, so 
much so that it has become synonomous with personal freedom. 99 
Intrinsic in the right to own land is the right to use land as the 
owner sees fit, which traditionally has been viewed as the right to 
use the land in the manner best suited to maximize short-term 
economic gain.IOo As experience has repeatedly shown, a myopic 
focus on short-term economic gain can often lead to disastrous re-
sults. 
Current history has demonstrated the incredible fragility of the 
various ecosystems that make up the planet. 101 The time has come, 
therefore, to adopt a stewardship ethic into property law. The stew-
ardship ethic calls for socially and ecologically responsible custody 
of land. 102 The stewardship ethic necessarily looks toward the future, 
because it realizes that future generations have a claim in the pres-
ent.103 
96 See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text. 
97 See supra notes 77-95 and accompanying text. 
98 See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 
99 Caldwell, supra note 68, at 320. 
100 [d. 
101 See supra note 3. 
102 Caldwell, supra note 68, at 323. 
103 An expression of the ethic is seen in the letterhead of the Jackson County, Wisconsin, 
Zoning and Sanitation Department: "The land belongs to the people . . . a little of it to those 
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The public trust doctrine can be the fiction through which the 
present generation is forced to take account of the generations yet 
to come, and of those future generations' right to the land.104 The 
public trust doctrine may be a way to institutionalize within the legal 
system the ancient belief that at least certain land should be beyond 
the absolute control of the present generation. 105 The next section, 
through an examination of the National Environmental Policy Act, 
considers whether a legal doctrine that requires the present gener-
ation to give formal legal consideration to future generations is 
possible within our present system. 
IV. ACCOMMODATING THE NEEDS OF THE FUTURE IN A SYSTEM 
GEARED TO THE PRESENT: NEPA AND THE STEWARDSHIP ETHIC 
The public trust doctrine should be used now to protect the rights 
of future generations. Some might protest that even a public trust 
doctrine geared toward protecting the interests of future generations 
is unnecessary. These protesters could point to any number of both 
federapo6 and state107 statutes that refer to future generations. These 
dead ... some to those living ... but most of it belongs to those yet to be born .... " Just 
v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 24 n.6, 201 N.W.2d 761, 771 n.6 (1972). 
104 The public trust doctrine has always stressed that, ideally, certain categories of land are 
common to all. Although the public trust doctrine has generally seemed to focus on the present 
generation as being the "all" to whom the land is "common," arguably it is not illegitimate to 
stretch the "all" to include future generations. On the subject of the duty of the present 
generation to a future generation, see Norton, Environmental Ethics and the Rights of Future 
Generations, 4 ENVTL. ETHICS 319 (1982); Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and 
Intergenerational Equity, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495 (1984). For a philosophical discussion of 
whether an unborn generation can be said to have any rights, see Kavka, The Paradox of 
Future Individuals, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 93 (1982); Parfit, Future Generations: Future 
Problems, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113 (1982). 
105 The legal roots of the public trust doctrine do not refer explicitly to a concern for future 
generations. Instead, the focus would appear to be on the rights of the present generation 
not to be excluded from certain lands. The public trust doctrine's legal roots seem to depend 
upon earlier conceptions of a Golden Age, however. One function of a Golden Age myth is to 
be a source of inspiration for the present so that society, through the efforts of the present 
generations, will, in the future, be more like the past Golden Age. 
106 For example, the statute that created the National Park Service stated that national 
parks were "to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife 
therein," so that these parks would be left "unimpaired for the enjoyment of future genera-
tions." 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Legislation creating specific natural sites also repeats this concern 
for future generations. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (addition of Mineral King Valley to 
Sequoia National Game Refuge); id. § 90 (North Cascades National Park); id. § 160 (Voyageurs 
National Park); id. § 45ge(a) (Fire Island National Seashore); id. § 460m-8 (Buffalo National 
River); id. § 460z (Oregon Dunes National Recreation Area); id. § 460cc (South Fork National 
River and Recreation Area); id. § 460gg (Hell's Canyon National Recreation Area); 16 
U.S.C.A. § 460m-15 (West Supp. 1989) (New River Gorge National River). 
107 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-l (West 1985) (declaration of state environmental 
policy includes responsibility to future generations); IND. CODE ANN. § 14-4-5-8 (Burns 1987) 
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protesters could also point out that courts have taken notice of future 
generations in cases that refer to these statutes. 108 
The preeminent statute concerning the present generation's duty 
to future generations is the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969 (NEPA).109 One commentator has argued that the concerns that 
the public trust doctrine was supposed to address are addressed by 
NEPA, including any concern for future generations. 110 Even if 
NEP A was meant to work as the modern federal counterpart of the 
public trust doctrine, it is not altogether clear that it carries out 
that role successfully. 
A. Background 
Congress did not necessarily intend NEP A to assume the impor-
tance that it currently has in the nation's environmental affairs.111 
Nevertheless, from its tangled roots, NEPA has become "the Sher-
man Act of environmentallaw,"112 "the most sweeping environmental 
law ever enacted by a United States Congress,"113 "an environmental 
Magna Carta,"114 and "the cornerstone of our federal resource pro-
(nature preserves are held in trust for present and future generations); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 146.220 (Michie 1987) (certain waterways are to be preserved, inter alia, for future gener-
ations); MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-12-102 (1987) (certain natural areas to be preserved for present 
and future generations); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-3 (1983) (declaration of state environmental 
policy includes responsibility to future generations); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1517.06 (Baldwin 
1984) (nature preserves to be held in trust for present and future generations); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 11-13-103 (1987) (certain river areas are to be protected for present and future 
generations); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79.70.010 (Supp. 1989) (natural area preserves are 
to be secured for present and future generations); W. VA. CODE § 20-5B-1 (1985) (certain 
streams are to be preserved in natural state for present and future generations). 
108 See, e.g., United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638,641 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. 
Ct. 787 (1989); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Nevada 
v. Herrington, 827 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1987); cases cited in Lazarus, supra note 4, at 
685 n.336. 
109 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
110 See Lazarus, supra note 4, at 684-87. 
111 "Whether Congress understood what it legislated, and expected that the environmental 
impact statement would become a major instrument of environmental review, is far from 
clear. Neither is it clear that Congress anticipated the extensive role the federal courts have 
assumed in NEPA's administration." D. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION: THE 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT § 2:04 (1984). For discussions of NEPA's legislative 
history, see id. at §§ 2:02-2:04; ANDREWS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
CHANGE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (1976); and R. 
LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH 1O~5 
(1976). 
112 W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 7.1, at 697 (1977). 
113 R. LIROFF, supra note 111, at 3. 
11. D. MANDELKER, supra note 111, § 1:01. 
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tection legislation. "U5 These are extraordinary praises for an envi-
ronmental statute that is neither technology-forcing nor standard-
setting. u6 
NEP A proclaims, as national policy, that it is the continuing re-
sponsibility of the federal government to use all practical means to 
ensure that the nation may "fulfill the responsibilities of each gen-
eration as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations."117 
Yet the sole implementing tool for this truly inspirational policyuS is 
the environmental impact statement (EIS) that must be drawn up 
to accompany any major federal action that significantly affects the 
human environment. 119 Not surprisingly, then, most disputes involv-
ing NEP A center on the need to prepare, or the adequacy of, an 
EIS.120 
Because of the strange combination of sweeping policy statements, 
or substantive goals, with the narrow procedural requirement of the 
115 Comment, Sealing Pandora's Box: Judicial Doctrines Restricting Public Trust Citizen 
Environmental Suits, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 439, 439 (1986). 
116 Frost, Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.: Authority Warranting Recon-
sideration of the Substantive Goals of the National Environmental Policy Act, 5 ALASKA L. 
REV. 15, 47 (1988). Frost points to, inter alia, section 301(b)(2)(A) of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (1982), as an example of an environmental 
statute that forces industry to develop technology that will aid in the reduction of water 
pollution. Frost, supra, at 47 n.162. Frost points to, inter alia, sections 108-09 of the Clean 
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (1982), as an example of an environmental statute that 
mandates that certain standards be met as a way of reducing air pollution. Id. 
11742 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (1982). 
liB The full text of Congress's declaration of the national environmental policy is worth 
reading in full: 
Id. 
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interrela-
tionships of all components of the natural environment, particularly the profound 
influences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, re-
source exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances and recognizing 
further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to 
the overall welfare and development of man, declares that it is the continuing policy 
of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, and 
other concerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and 
measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster 
and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man 
and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other 
requirements of present and future generations of Americans. 
119 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982). 
120 See, e.g., Z. PLATER, R. ABRAMS, & P. SCHROTH, NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 348 
(1988) (unpublished and on file with author); Annotation, Construction and Application of 
§§ 101-105 of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335) Requiring 
All Federal Agencies to Consider Environmental Factors in Their Planning and Decision-
making, 17 A.L.R. FED. 33 (1973 & Supp. 1988) 
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EIS, NEPA suffers from a sort of a statutory split personality. The 
split arises out of the virtually exclusive focus on the EIS in most 
disputes involving NEPA. Thus, the goal of NEPA-the creation of 
a productive harmony between people and nature121 - is often lost 
in the emphasis on procedural compliance. 
B. N EPA as Procedure 
The Supreme Court has not considered NEP A to be much more 
than a procedural hurdle through which a federal agency may jump 
upon completion of an EIS. In a line of decisions, the Supreme Court 
has ruled that NEP A sets forth procedural guidelines, and does not 
declare substantive law. 
In Kleppe v. Sierra Club,122 several environmental groups brought 
suit against the Department of the Interior, claiming that the De-
partment could not plan further development of certain coal reserves 
without first preparing a regional EIS.123 The Court reversed an 
injunction that had been issued by the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit,124 holding that the environmental 
groups had failed to show that there had been any major federal 
action with respect to the region. 125 
Although Kleppe turned largely upon whether or not the Depart-
ment of the Interior was considering a regional plan, the Court did 
note that it could not substantively review an agency's decision to 
select a certain alternative from the alternatives specified in the 
EIS.126 A court could only make sure that the agency had taken a 
"hard look" at the environmental consequences of its actions. 127 Any 
court that second-guessed the agency's choice would be impermis-
sibly intruding into the protected area of executive discretion. 128 This 
line of reasoning soon became a recurring theme. 
12142 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1982). This goal is reminiscent of Ovid's description of the Golden 
Age. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
122427 U.S. 390 (1976). 
123 Id. at 394-95. The region to which the environmental groups referred was the "Northern 
Great Plains region," which encompassed parts of Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota, and 
South Dakota. Id. at 396. 
124 The District of Columbia Circuit Court issued an injunction preventing the implemen-
tation of mining plans in the region, id. at 395, and later held that, if the Department did plan 
to control the development of coal mining in the region, then an EIS would be required. Id. 
at 403. 
125Id. at 399. The Court, however, did note that there were "proposals ... for actions ... 
[that are] either local or national [in] scope." Id. 
126Id. at 410 n.21. 
127Id. (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (1972». 
128 Id. 
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In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 129 the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) 
challenged the Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) adoption of rules 
pertaining to the cost-benefit analysis of the uranium fuel-cycle in 
certain nuclear reactors, and the decision by the AEC not to apply 
this rule to the Vermont Yankee licensing proceedings. Although 
the bulk of the opinion focused on administrative law, the Court, in 
an apparent afterthought, makes "one further observation of some 
relevance to this case. "130 After lambasting the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court for impermissibly interfering with congressional policy 
decisions,131 the Court stated that NEPA's mandate to federal agen-
cies is essentially procedural. 132 The Court cited Kleppe as a re-
minder that a court has limited power to review the sufficiency of 
environmental factors. 133 
Thus, from Vermont Yankee emerges a vision ofNEPA that seems 
to eviscerate the great purposes of the statute. While the Court does 
suggest, at the very end, that a decision made by an agency pursuant 
to NEP A could be set aside for substantive reasons,134 the entire 
thrust of the opinion is to set limitations on the ability of a court to 
review a NEPA decision substantively. 
The Court followed Vermont Yankee's reasoning in Strycker's 
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen. 135 In Karlen, the Court over-
turned a Second Circuit decision that had held that the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had not given enough 
weight to certain environmental factors in its evaluation of a low-
income housing development. 136 Citing Vermont Yankee's dicta that 
NEP A is essentially procedural,137 the Court stated that this pro-
cedural view of NEP A meant that an agency was not bound to 
129 435 u.s. 519 (1978). 
130 [d. at 557. 
131 [d. at 557-58. 
132 [d. at 558. 
133 Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 555. 
134 "Administrative decisions should be set aside in [a NEPAl context, as in every other, 
only for substantial procedural or substantive reasons .... " [d. at 558 (citing Consolo v. 
Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Even here, however, the Court cautioned 
against overturning an agency decision merely because the court is "unhappy with the result 
reached." [d. 
135 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per curiam). 
136 [d. at 227. Specifically, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was concerned with "crowd-
ing low-income housing into a concentrated area." [d. (quoting Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39, 
44 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
137 [d. (citing Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558). 
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"elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate considera-
tions. "138 Thus, the only role for a court was to make sure that an 
agency considered the environmental consequences of whatever ac-
tion the agency was taking. 139 
Finally, the Court held in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Counci[140 that a court, when reviewing an agen-
cy's NEPA actions, should simply ensure that the agency has ade-
quately considered the environmental impact of its actions. If an 
agency has adequately considered its impacts, and has disclosed 
those impacts, then a reviewing court may only review the agency's 
actions under the arbitrary and capricious standard. 141 
Through this line of cases, the Supreme Court has effectively 
reduced NEP A-whose purpose was to create a productive harmony 
between people and nature _142 to a mere full disclosure law, whose 
application is to be reviewed by the very lax standard of the arbi-
trary and capricious test. Any attempt to argue that NEP A is a 
substantive statute starts out with the heavy burden of refuting the 
Supreme Court's procedural holdings over the past fourteen years. 
C. NEPA as Substance 
Despite these procedural holdings, authority does exist for the 
argument that NEPA should be, and is, a substantive statute. For 
example, NEPA did more than declare environmental policy and 
require the filing of EISs. It also created the Council on Environ-
mental Quality (CEQ),143 and charged CEQ with making recommen-
dations to the President on how to implement the policy goals of 
NEPA.144 The Supreme Court has noted that CEQ's interpretation 
of NEPA should be given substantial deference. 145 
138 Id. 
139 Id. Although the Court cites Kleppe as support for its view that an agency must consider 
the environmental consequences, Kleppe itself spoke of a "hard look." For a discussion of 
Kleppe, see supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text. 
140 462 U. S. 87 (1983) (a continuation of Vermont Yankee's controversy over AEC regulations 
concerning fuel-cycles in nuclear reactors). 
141Id. at 97-98. 
142 See supra note 12l. 
143 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1982). 
144 I d. § 4344(3). 
145 Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (citing Warm Springs Dam Task Force 
v. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301, 1309-10 (1974) (Douglas, J., Circuit Justice». Although deference 
to an agency charged with implementing a statute is hardly novel, CEQ, strictly speaking, 
has not been charged with implementing NEPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1982). It is the 
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If the Supreme Court did in fact give CEQ's interpretation of 
NEPA substantial deference, then the Court would not have devel-
oped the Kleppe/Vermont Yankee line of cases. 146 As CEQ states: 
"NEPA's purpose is not to generate paperwork-even excellent pa-
perwork-but to foster excellent action. The NEP A process is in-
tended to help public officials make decisions that are based on 
understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that 
protect, restore, and enhance the environment."147 Thus, NEPA is 
meant to do more than simply ensure that agencies consider148 en-
vironmental consequences: NEPA is meant to influence the action 
taken. 149 
CEQ's vision of what an EIS is supposed to be also differs from 
that of the Supreme Court. While the Court focuses on disclosure, 150 
CEQ makes clear that an EIS is more than a disclosure document. 151 
Rather, the EIS is an action-forcing device intended to ensure "that 
the policies and goals . .. [of NEPA] are infused into the ongoing 
programs and actions of the Federal Government. "152 
Finally, the text of NEP A itself would seem to belie any contention 
that NEPA is merely a procedural statute. NEPA mandates that all 
policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States be inter-
preted and administered to the fullest extent possible according to 
NEPA's substantive goals. 153 
individual agencies who are to implement NEPA by filing the necessary EISs. Of course, 
CEQ has promulgated regulations to guide the various agencies in drafting an EIS, 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 1502 (1987), and these regulations must be followed. 40 C.F.R. § 1507.1. 
146 See supra notes 122-42 and accompanying text. 
147 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (1987) (emphasis added). 
148 Strycker's Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (per curiam). 
149 This reading of NEPA would also appear to contradict the Supreme Court's assertion 
that NEPA does not require elevation of environmental concerns over other appropriate 
agency concerns. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
150 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
1S140 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1987). Of course, proponents of the "NEPA as procedure" view 
would argue that the Supreme Court is stating what a court may look for when it reviews an 
EIS, and is not reducing the EIS to a mere disclosure statement. Although this interpretation 
technically may be true, its practical effect is to reduce the EIS to a mere disclosure statement 
and not to force agencies to act in a manner consistent with CEQ's vision of the NEPA 
process. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. It should be noted that CEQ believes 
that the courts also have the responsibility of enforcing NEPA "so as to achieve the substantive 
requirements of section 101 [(NEPA's policy statement)]." 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (1987). 
1S2 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1987) (emphasis added). CEQ repeatedly refers to the need to ensure 
that the "policy" or "spirit" of NEPA is enforced. See, e.g., id. §§ 1500.1(a), 1500.3, 1502.1, 
1502.2(d), 1505.1. 
153 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982). These words seem to be about as clear as congressional directives 
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D. The Importance of the Stewardship Ethic in NEPA 
Earlier this Comment discussed the stewardship ethic and how 
the public trust doctrine might serve as a vehicle to bring this 
stewardship ethic into law. 154 If, as one commentator has argued, 
NEPA does statutorily incorporate the public trust doctrine into 
federal law,155 then NEP A should also be able to serve as a vehicle 
to bring the stewardship ethic into law. NEPA's split personality156 
is important because each of NEPA's two personalities-procedure 
and substance-belies a very different attitude toward the environ-
ment. 
One commentator, Don Frost, recently has written about the 
philosophic basis of NEP A's substantive goals. 157 He argues that two 
philosophical theories provide a possible basis for NEPA's policy 
mandate. 158 The first theory, utilitarianism, ultimately favors devel-
opment over environmental protection. 159 Conversely, the second 
theory, environmentalism, encourages environmental protection. 160 
Because NEPA's substantive goals are premised on the need to 
protect the environment,161 it is clear that the utilitarian philosophy 
must be rejected. 162 Environmentalism, on the other hand, is based 
on the belief that people's relationship with nature must be harmo-
get, so an appeal to legislative history should not be necessary. If such an appeal is made, 
however, little clarification is gained. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
154 See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text. 
155 Lazarus, supra note 4, at 684-87. 
156 See supra notes 111-53 and accompanying text. 
157 Frost, supra note 116, at 33-47. 
158 I d. at 33. 
159Id. 
160 Id. 
161 I d. at 22. 
162 Frost discusses two types of utilitarianism: exploitative, id. at 34-37, and environmen-
tally-conscious, id. at 37-42. Exploitative utilitarianism is "based on the belief that [people] 
... should use and consume the earth's resources as quickly as possible, so long as exploitation 
is in [people's] ... or an individual's present best interest." I d. at 33-34. Such a philosophy 
would not implement NEPA's mandate of creating a harmonious relationship between people 
and nature. Id. at 37. 
Environmentally-conscious utilitarianism sees the environment as "an entity that must be 
managed in order to maximize its productivity." Id. at 34. This approach is also not a tenable 
basis for NEPA's substantive goals, due to the difficulty of quantifying the environment in 
economic terms, the problem with discounting the costs to future generations, and the risk of 
changing economic values over time. Id. at 41-42. 
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nious. 163 It is clear that this philosophy is consonant with NEPA's 
goals. 164 
Unfortunately, it is also clear that agencies have not applied 
NEPA in accordance with what Frost calls duty-based environmen-
talism, or what this Comment refers to as the stewardship ethic. 165 
Because of the Supreme Court's insistence that NEP A is essentially 
procedural,166 Frost argues that NEPA's substantive mandate of 
duty-based environmentalism has been undermined. 167 Using Frost's 
terms, then, it would appear that the Supreme Court sees utilitar-
ianism, rather than duty-based environmentalism, as the basis for 
NEPA.168 Thus, the split personality of NEPA may be caused by 
differing philosophies about land ownership. 
If NEPA is presumed to have taken the place of the public trust 
doctrine,169 it must be applied with a clear view toward, and perhaps 
even a preference for, the rights of future generations. Yet the 
bifurcation of NEPA's procedure and substance endangers the rights 
of future generations by allowing agencies to discount these gener-
ations. 17o It would thus seem reasonable to question whether NEPA 
has indeed taken the place of the public trust doctrine. 
163 [d. at 42. Frost discusses two types of environmentalism: biocentrism, id. at 42-43, and 
duty-based, id. at 44-46. Biocentrism believes that humans are "indistinguishable in kind 
from the other inhabitants of the earth." [d. at 42. Because this philosophy fails to take 
account of people's "dual nature-[theirl ... thinking and nonthinking selves," Frost rejects 
it as "impractical and unrealistic." [d. at 43. 
Duty-based environmentalism states that humans have a duty "to preserve the environment 
and its inhabitants." [d. at 42. Part of the duty-based environmentalism belief is that the 
present generation is obliged to "provide future generations with a clean and healthy envi-
ronment." [d. at 45. 
164 "[Wlith NEPA, Congress clearly intended to enact an environmental policy founded on 
duty-based environmentalism." [d. at 50. But see supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
165 Both the stewardship ethic and duty-based environmentalism are concerned with the 
present generation's obligation to future generations, and how this obligation affects property 
law and land use. See supra note 163. 
166 See supra notes 122-42 and accompanying text. 
167 Frost, supra note 116, at 56. 
168 Because the Supreme Court appears to view NEPA cases as questions of the standard 
of review to be applied to agency actions, see supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text, it 
is probably more precise to say that the Court allows agencies to use utilitarianism as the 
basis for NEP A. 
169 Lazarus, supra note 4, at 684-87. 
170 If a court can only make sure that NEPA's procedures have been followed, it cannot 
easily question the substance of an agency decision that disregards the rights of future 
generations. 
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V. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND NEPA: VANGUARDS FOR 
THE STEWARDSHIP ETHIC 
Both the public trust doctrine l7l and NEPA172 are possible vehicles 
to bring the stewardship ethic into law. Both present problems as 
vehicles, however: the public trust doctrine is criticized as illegiti-
mate and redundant,173 and NEP A is interpreted so as to render 
policy goals virtually meaningless. 174 
A. NEPA and the Stewardship Ethic 
If NEP A is to serve as a vehicle for bringing the stewardship 
ethic into law, the debate over NEP A must shift from the substance/ 
procedure dilemma to a consideration of how best to protect the 
rights of future generations. Some suggestions as how best to protect 
these rights follow. 
1. The Stewardship Ethic in NEP A as Procedure 
Even if NEP A were to remain essentially procedural, courts could 
require agencies to include extended and explicit discussions about 
the impact of their actions on future generations in an EIS.175 This 
suggestion is hardly radical; indeed, the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court has already considered this issue. 
In Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld,176 the appellants alleged 
several flaws in an EIS drawn up by the Navy in connection with 
the planning of a Trident submarine base at Bangor, Washington.l77 
Noting that the Navy had a duty to fulfill the policy goals of NEPA, 178 
171 See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text. 
172 See supra notes 154-70 and accompanying text. 
173 See supra notes 77-97 and accompanying text. 
174 See supra notes 122-42 and accompanying text. 
175 An EIS is required to discuss "the relationship between local short-term uses of [the] 
... environment and the maintenance and enhancement oflong-term productivity." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(C)(iv) (1982). 
176 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
177 Appellants alleged that the EIS 
"does not adequately analyze and describe alternatives to the Bangor dedicated site; 
fails to adequately assess the enviromental impacts outside of Kitsap County; fails to 
discuss the impacts of the possible deployment of more than ten submarines and the 
early termination of the Trident Program; does not adequately analyze the fiscal 
impacts of the Program; and finally, is short-sighted in assessing the environmental 
impacts only up to 1981." 
Id. at 826-27 (emphasis added). 
178 I d. at 829. 
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the court remanded the EIS back to the Navy for correction of 
certain deficiencies. 179 The court ordered the Navy to forecast the 
environmental impacts of the proposed base beyond the 1981 date 
that had been chosen as the EIS cutoff date,l80 stating that it was 
imperative that the Navy make a reasonable effort to determine 
what impacts the proposed base would cause beyond 1981. 181 
Similarly, in Potomac Alliance v. United States Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission,182 the District of Columbia Circuit Court upheld 
the appellant's charges that the NRC violated NEPA by failing to 
consider the long-range effects of granting an amendment to a re-
actor's license. 183 In his concurring opinion, Judge Bazelon noted that 
the NRC had to extend its consideration of the environmental im-
pacts beyond the year 2011184 because the NRC could not state that 
there was no reasonably foreseeable possibility that the environ-
mental impacts would not continue past that year. 185 
By requiring agencies to consider the impact of their actions on 
future generations extensively and explicitly, it may also be possible 
to develop the basis for a later arbitrary and capricious challenge. 
If, as a result of completing an EIS in the manner described, an 
agency determines that it risks possible severe harm to the interests 
of future generations, and the agency nevertheless decides to go 
ahead with the action, a group who challenges this decision may have 
a slightly better chance to argue that the decision was arbitrary and 
capricious. 
2. The Stewardship Ethic in NEP A as Substance 
The rights of future generations could also be protected in more 
substantive ways. Of course, the best substantive protection would 
be for the Supreme Court to reverse itself and state that NEP A is 
179 [d. at 830. 
1M [d. 
181 [d. The court noted that the Navy did have some basis for choosing 1981 as the cutoff 
date, but that it simply could not agree with the Navy that 1981 was the proper cutoff date. 
[d. at 829-30. 
182 682 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
183 [d. at 1031. The Virginia Electric Power Company had sought, and was granted, an 
amendment to its NRC license for its North Anna Nuclear Power Station to increase the 
capacity of its spent-fuel pool. [d. In issuing the amendment, the NRC considered environ-
mental impacts through the year 2011, because the plant's license expired in that year. [d. at 
1033 (Bazelon, J., concurring). 
184 [d. at 1036-37 (Bazelon, J., concurring). 
185 [d. at 1036 (Bazelon, J., concurring). 
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a substantive statute. Such a reversal, however, IS not likely to 
happen soon. 
Perhaps another way to protect the interests of future generations 
is to change who writes an EIS. Presently, the agency seeking to 
perform some action writes an EIS. Often, however, the mandate 
of NEPA to write an EIS conflicts with the main statutory mission 
of the authoring agency.186 If such a conflict exists, the temptation 
is great for the agency to write an EIS so as to allow itself the 
possibility of achieving its statutory mission. 187 
This temptation could be avoided by centralizing the writing of 
EISs into one agency, by charging either the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, the CEQ, or some newly created agency with draft-
ing all EISs for the government. Although any agency charged with 
writing EISs may suffer from lax enforcement due to political vicis-
situdes, the creation of a new agency whose sole purpose is to write 
EISs may help to create more objective EISs, free from conflicting 
mandates. 
B. The Need for the Public Trust Doctrine as a Vehicle for the 
Stewardship Ethic 
If NEPA was meant to incorporate the public trust doctrine, it 
has failed. This reason alone should silence the critics who call for 
the abandonment of the public trust doctrine. But even if NEP A 
had been (or will be) more successful in incorporating the public 
trust doctrine, the public trust doctrine itself should still not be 
relegated to history. 
As a doctrine that has its roots in Roman antiquity, and perhaps 
earlier,l88 the public trust doctrine bespeaks an ancient realization-
one so badly needed today-that humanity's relationship to the land 
is much more than what is contained in any property law or land-
use system. It has been a slowly developing doctrine over much of 
its history, with periods of dormancy and rapid expansion. But what 
is most important is that, while the public trust doctrine has become 
a legal doctrine, its purpose is to attack a legal system of land 
ownership that is environmentally unsound. If the stewardship ethic 
is ever to become part of the law, it must come from a source that 
attacks the very premises of the reigning legal system of land own-
ership-from a source like the public trust doctrine. 
186 Z. PLATER & R. ABRAMS, supra note 120, at 367. 
187 I d. at 368. 
188 See supra notes 10-23 and accompanying text. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The public trust doctrine can be a tool through which the stew-
ardship ethic can be introduced effectively into American law and 
society. A review of the history of the public trust doctrine shows 
that the doctrine has been more of a statement of what ought to be 
the law than an accurate reflection of how the law actually oper-
ates. 189 Current criticisms of the public trust doctrine, by focusing 
on the past and present uses of the doctrine, lose sight of its potential 
for future use. 190 Criticisms of the public trust doctrine that argue 
that the doctrine has been preempted by NEPA fall upon the rocks 
of the Supreme Court's interpretation of NEPA as procedural. 191 
Although NEP A could be treated as a statute of real substance, 192 
such an interpretation would require reversal of Supreme Court 
precedent, which is unlikely to occur. 
The bifurcation of NEP A into procedure and substance is symp-
tomatic of a deep-seated attitude toward ownership of land. 193 It is 
this attitude-an attitude that the present generation is free to 
exploit the land it owns in whatever manner the present generation 
feels economically justifiable-that a renewed public trust doctrine 
would attack. It is this attitude that must be attacked if our planet 
is to survive. 
189 See supra notes 10-65 and accompanying text. 
100 See supra notes 77-105 and accompanying text. 
191 See supra notes 106-42 and accompanying text. 
192 See supra notes 143-53 and accompanying text. 
193 See supra notes 154-70 and accompanying text. 
